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ABIDETH FOREVER?
GLOBAL USE OF SEMIARID LANDS IN THE INTERWAR YEARS

]. M. POWELL

I

have undertaken a highly selective Cook's
Tour in this article, attempting to integrate
our understanding of semiarid lands around
the globe. The focus is concentrated on the
period between the two great wars when new
nationalisms, old imperial networks, and the
burgeoning ambitions of scientists combined
to create new systems of land use in the
semiarid regions, but a few sorties have been
made into earlier and later periods to assist the
interpretation of specific projects. My own
country, Australia, is used as the starting point
for the tour, but the influence of American
Donald Worster's Dust Bowl (1979) will be
easily discerned. I have argued that the environmental and economic crises around the
world in the interwar years were to some
extent culturally induced and that they were
linked by similar assumptions, crossing cultur-

al and economic lines, about the potential and
rationale for settlement in semiarid lands.
Heavy investment in science and technology,
multiple ways to manage risk and indebtedness, and expansions of the scale of Westernstyle capitalistic farming in semiarid areas were
typical of capitalist economies, but consideration is also given to developments in semiarid
regions characterized by communist and
mixed economies.
The whirlwind nature of my tour has
forced the exclusion of some details and
ambiguities: I have asked, instead, if decisions
about the management of these many different
regions were developed within the region as a
result of experience or outside the region in
response to planners' hopes for the society as a
whole. Thus a nationalist or imperialist rhetoric is counterposed to the empirical findings of
scientists and settlers committed to a particular
place and personally witness to the stringencies
of a particular semiarid environment. Symbolic of cultural determinism, implicit in the
following interpretations, is the case of Griffith
Taylor, the founding father of academic geography in Australia. His writings on environmental limitations to settlement and
agricultural production were angrily banned
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by boosters who preferred to believe, with
Arctic explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson, that
"the worthlessness of any large territory is
imaginary ... Such a territory is worthless
simply because people insist on thinking it so"
(Powell 1980).
Let me set the scene. First, there were
extensive semiarid plains in both hemispheres-the grasslands, pampas, prairies, savannas, steppes, and the great alluvial or
"riverine" plains. During the period between
the world wars, the influential sections of some
communities were obsessed with Lebensraum,
ecumene, and national self-sufficiency, and they
considered the plains environments relatively
underused. Second, there were quantum leaps
in scientific and technological information in
the early twentieth century, and the efforts of
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some individuals and groups to coordinate and
synthesize these developments were distinctive
characteristics of the interwar years. The
scientists' hopes for accelerated social reform
and economic development found appropriate
tasks on the semiarid frontiers. Third, in
China and in the U.S.S.R. science was to be
harnessed to revolutionary change as the
peasant modes of settlement were replaced by
collectives and state farms. Semiarid country
was again prominently in focus. Fourth,
though historians have argued that peasant
cultivators and herders in the communist
world paid the highest price for changes during
this period, heavy costs were also levied on the
semiarid plains of advanced, developing, and
less developed countries within the Western
sphere of influence.
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Simplified average annual rainfall map for Australia, showing state boundaries and capital
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RANCHERS AND NOMADS: AUSTRALIA

Leading a decrepit one-eyed horse, a lonely
boy scarcely into his teens moved quietly out
of his Adelaide home. His destination was the
Barrier Range in the Corner Country of New
South Wales-specifically, the Poolamacca
Station, where his brother George lived.
George found him dubious employment with a
landless bushman who lived close to nature
and beyond the law, moving his stock around
the unfenced properties on that wide frontier.
The youth learned other bush skills from his
native companions and over the years his
involvement in carting, coaching, droving,
and meat supply made him widely known in
isolated mining and grazing communities. By
the time he was thirty years old, his coaching
business covered western New South Wales
and parts of Western Australia; he was supplying his own horses to this trade and was
beginning to provide remounts for the British
Army in India. By the outbreak of the Great
War his business had survived droughts and
depressions and floods, and he controlled
numerous farms and stations, mainly cattle
country, that exceeded in area the whole of
England.
The boy was Sidney Kidman (1857-1935),
the future "cattle king." The supremely independent, opportunistic Kidman conceived a
brilliant management strategy in response to
the outback challenge-he developed great
chains of carefully located properties reaching
from the remotest northwestern corner of
Australia to the Flinders Ranges, in striking
distance of the Adelaide market. An oblique
line directly drawn some two thousand kilometers across the continent gives some impression
of the scale of operations: Kidman linked his
interests in the monsoonal country bordering
the Gulf of Carpentaria with others in the
backcountry of western Queensland and New
South Wales, thereby picking up the chances
offered by occasional southerly flows in the
Georgina and Diamantina rivers, and down
the Coopers Creek district into South Australia. It was an aggressive stroke, seemingly an

uninhibited application of the lessons of the
nomads' flexibility and opportunism to Kidman's own relentless search for profit. His
empire included agencies in each of the capital
cities and in some of the provincial towns,
with any number of interlocking companies
and partnerships to bamboozle the most
efficient taxation inspector. In the 1930s he
owned or had an interest in a huge amount of
land, variously estimated at between 126,000
and 170,000 square kilometers.
In its major emphases Kidman's approach
to land management was at once innovative
and traditional. Although it was highly individualistic it was also built on broader conventional wisdom derived over generations of
aboriginal settlement. And, despite his ultimate achievements, Kidman did not escape
the hazards endemic to the inland: although
the great drought of 1902 punished most of his
neighbors far more severely, it nearly brought
him to his knees, and his empire, though not
destroyed, was broken up during the 1925-32
drought.
PROBLEMS OF TENURE

Kidman's pastoral kingdom was built on
judiciously selected leaseholds. Indeed, it was
the leasing principle that had provided the
framework for most semiarid and arid land
settlement in Australia since the middle of the
nineteenth century-and that remains dominant today. These leasehold tenures have
resulted from dynamic interchanges between
official and popular evaluations of land in a
dramatically unpredictable climate. Ownership rests ultimately in the Crown-that is,
in the community at large, politically represented at federal and state levels-and the
leasing arrangements declare rights and responsibilities regarding such items as the
length of tenure, the size of the holding,
amount of rental expected, types of enterprise
and permitted stock-carrying capacities, and
even a few directions relating to the required
backgrounds and qualifications of leaseholders. Therefore, the leasehold is a living docu-

154 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1986

ment incorporating the product of officialpopular interplay at any moment in fat, lean,
and indifferent times.
The frontier pastoralists frequently acted in
advance or in open defiance of their governments, and their pioneer adaptations helped to
shape the evolving leasehold arrangements.
They stocked heavily in the good seasons and
generally strove to hold on to as large an area
as possible in an attempt to contain the effects
of localized droughts; their experience gradually enabled them to recognize the unpredictable
nature of the resource base, and they were
persuaded toward the commonsensical adaptation of high levels of temporal and spatial
mobility. In marked contrast, until the late
interwar period, the consuming concern of
state and federal authorities was to intensify
the occupation of all the marginal lands, and
they abandoned that position with reluctance.
How BIG Is A HOMESTEAD?

Because official viewpoints were naturally
influenced by the powerful urban interests,
some of the most enduring contributions to
the leasehold as a structural adjustment to
marginality came in the form of a wider
diffusion of the "welfare state" ideal. The most
telling example was the direct incorporation of
the notion of "living areas" or "maintenance
areas" into the land legislation of certain
states. The major problem was in defining the
area required to support a family unit. It was
difficult enough to find agreement on an
"average family" or on expectations of a
reasonable "standard of living." The selection
of a reliable measuring stick was no easier. The
capacity to carry a specified minimum number
of stock per holding, or merely the area of the
holding, variously found favor. Debates on
these issues focused on the differences between
experiential and theoretical understandings of
the environment. Competent local and regional inventories are obviously needed and,
accordingly, there has always been significant
potential for the forceful presentation of
popular claims confidently based on familiar

statistical and other evidence. In New South
Wales and Queensland the early efforts of the
authorities were directed toward restricting the
maximum sizes and ensuring a defined minimum area for individual pastoralists. Governments consistently argued for a progressive
intensification of settlement despite uncertainties, thus by implication admitting their responsibility to settlers.
Early official definitions of homestead
maintenance areas in semiarid New South
Wales favored nine square miles (5,760 acres)
in 1883; at the end of the century preferences
oscillated between a doubling of the previous
standard and a measure based on proven
carrying capacities ranging from 4,000 to 8,000
sheep or sheep equivalents, depending mainly
on climatic conditions. Queensland was more
generous, sanctioning 20,000 acres in 1897 and
increasing this to 40,000 and 60,000 acres for
the drier west a few years later. Living areas in
each state continued to increase. In New
South Wales after 1938 the living standard of
the land, as well as the people, was to be taken
into account-safeguards for the preservation
of soil and vegetation were written into the
leasing provisions. Queensland's 1927 Act
allowed the necessity of sufficient land to offer
a "reasonable reserve" or cushion during the
droughts, and after World War II individuals
were permitted to obtain chains of leaseholds
where it could be shown that they were to be
run as a risk-spreading unit taking maximum
advantage of environmental diversity. Lessons
learned by the pastoralists themselves usually
provided most of the legislators' cues, and
adjustments to leasehold structures frequently
owed something to a collective politicization of
Australia's graziers.
OTHER ADJUSTMENTS TO THE LAND

Australian graziers and government officials learned from their mistakes. They also
learned from the widespread results of empirical testing or "folk experimentation" in Australia's marginal environments, notably in the
late-nineteenth century advance-retreat se-
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quence of wheat farming in South Australia's
northern district beyond Goyder's Line. However, some mistakes were repeated. In the
absence of freehold rights, users may choose to
continue environmentally destructive practices in search of short-term profit. Errors in
official management policies may teach land
users to doubt the authorities' wisdom and to
milk government agencies for part of the
financial backing needed to attempt the kind
of geographical diversification practiced by
Kidman. Nor were the decisions always made
by individuals. At various periods, companies
and partnerships have been more common
than individual family holdings, and of course
the banks have held immense tracts from time
to time.
Only the sheer immensity of his operations
distinguished Sidney Kidman's audacious strategies from thousands of more modest ones. From
the middle of the nineteenth century, in grain
and grazing regions alike, settlers made strenuous efforts to achieve official sanction for
larger minimum areas while simultaneously
maneuvering to obtain their own more viable
units, even in defiance of the law, and notably
in combination with family members or neighbors. The resulting mosaic of fragmented units
was more characteristic than the compact
blocks sketched out by the legislators.
While management of land itself progressed
in. a variety of legal and extra-legal fashions,
management of distance was accomplished by
official and private cooperation. The good
economic sense of droving was not easily
shaken; it remained a uniquely Australian
institution, variously romanticized. In the
inter-war period a myriad of "travelling stock
routes" in every state guaranteed graziers
public access at nominal fees. Many routes
remain today, despite the recent rapid introduction of road transport, and their estimated
total area of over ten million acres provides
critical supplementary reserves during the
droughts (McKnight 1977). In the nineteenth
century, camels successfully replaced horse
teams and bullocks over wide areas, and the
telegraph and later the telephone and radio

blessedly reduced the sense of isolation. Education by correspondence was encouraged in the
early twentieth century by such technologies;
even the humble bicycle brought a degree of
local and regional emancipation and increased
the spatial competitiveness of mobs of itinerant shearers and other rural workers (fitzpatrick 1980). Health care also came to the
outback. Beginning in 1911, Bush Nursing
Associations provided autonomous and selfcontained medical care for isolated rural
communities too small to support their own
doctors. Similarly, the Flying Doctor Service,
which is currently government-supported and
registers over 100,000 consultations annually,
began in 1927 as part of the Presbyterian
Church's Australian Inland Mission.
These valued Australian adjustments
mainly developed in situ within a relatively
advanced and homogeneous white population
that is still disadvantaged by isolation (Avery
et al. 1980; Lonsdale and Holmes 1981). By the
1930s the aboriginal community formed a
minuscule residual, largely concentrated on
outback reserves or as workers on pastoral
stations. Despite their small numbers, their
extraordinary skills as all round stockmen were
significant in the cattle regions on the arid
fringes; their co-option as underpaid workers
was one of the more exploitative adaptations
developed by bigger British and Australian
leaseholders. At least those native people
survived, after a fashion, in the dominant
white society. They and their grandchildren
have been pressing the case for a better deal
over recent years, with such effect that they
now hold far more inclusive rights over some
large semiarid areas than any whites have been
able to obtain.

PASTORALISM IN ASIA AND AFRICA

Elsewhere in the world traditional pastoral
nomads continued to be subjected to intrusive
"modernizing" forces throughout the interwar
years. For example, the peoples of Outer
Mongolia, who could boast their own distinc-
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tive heritage of imperial activities, had become
locked between China and Russia and dependent on both. Surrounded by revolution in
the only world they knew, they were soon
easily conquered and effectively brought within the Soviet empire. Their active and passive
resistance to the collectivization plans of
Stalinist Russia weakened the ancient economic and social base, precipitating disruption that
stymied planners for thirty-five years.
Western-style imperialism in Africa in the
period between the world wars was even more
damaging, insofar as its consequences have
resonated down the years to plague today's
independent African states. Stereotyped
images of the pastoral Masai, for instance,
were partly manufactured in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries by competing
Europeans who described them as living
anachronisms-inefficient and careless users of
the land who held cattle for reasons of status
and were culturally resistant to the marketplace and other innovations. Such fictions and
exaggerations encouraged attempts to replace
their pastoral ways by more modern practices.
Yet in the 1930s and 1940s the Masai successfully marketed large numbers of cattle, including scores of thousands to an enterprising
meat-canning firm, and they had developed
admirable social and ecological adaptations to
cope with their difficult environments. Furthermore, these were enlightened, rationally
based adjustments, maintaining an emphasis
on mutual aid and cooperation and including
strong sanctions to curb inefficient uses. Such
a well-tried ethical system provided a valuable
but long-neglected indigenous base for sensitive and sustained development programs.
Even in our own times misleading testimony
from tourist interests has criticized Masai
herders for competing with valuable wild
animals, when there is good ecological evidence that the long-grass preference of their
cattle improves many habitats. As this example shows, the presumptuous importation of
ethnocentric planning strategies may be ineffective or destructive in traditional societies
(Bates and Lofchie 1980).

CONFLICTS BETWEEN EXPERTS

Despite the evidence that pastoralists were
living successfully in the semiarid lands of the
globe before World War I, the emphasis of
nationally and globally oriented planners was
toward agricultural development. In June 1924
a strange group of high-caste dudes proceeded
into the enigmatic interior of Australia in a
caravan of Dodge cars. Their leader was the
Canadian Arctic explorer and adventurer
Vilhjamur Stefansson, and their purpose was
to garner support for the idea that Australia's
"empty" spaces could be settled by whites and
that this-considering comparisons based on
land area alone-could turn Australia into a
rival of the United States in power and
population. Stefansson had already discussed
northern expansion with Canada's prime
minister, Sir Robert Borden. Now, at the
invitation of Australia's influential boosters,
he was ready to take on that continent.
Stefansson's favored theme was well established in Australia's newspapers before his
outback jaunt began. Reminding readers of the
curious misperception of the "Great American
desert," he assured them that human ingenuity was paramount and that no desert-hot or
cold, real or supposed-could defeat a civilized
people with modern science at their disposal.
His glowing reports from the "expedition"
bases fell like a rain of confidence on the
shriveled consciences of leading Australians.
In opposition was geographer Griffith
Taylor, whose aggressive writings on climatic
controls in agricultural production and more
generally on the severe environmental limitations on future white settlement were by no
means confined to the professional journals.
Taylor had deliberately set out to debunk the
boosters. For more than a decade he had
exposed and ridiculed the naive promotion of
"Australia Unlimited." Using elementary resource inventories and latitudinal analogies,
he predicted a total population of about
nineteen or twenty million by the end of the
century. Stefansson's tour was clearly intended
as a direct challenge to Taylor, who promptly

ABIDETH FOREVER? 157

replied with a far more detailed field investigation of the inner margins of settlement around
the continent. In the ensuing furore the
uncompromising Taylor was widely disowned
as "unpatriotic," a "croaking pessimist," and,
ultimately, an "environmental determinist."
The episode appears to confirm the pervasiveness of various types of colonial dependency. Australia's "underused" capacities had
been promoted in a long succession of Imperial
Conferences. Above all, the Dominions Royal
Commission (1912-17) had suggested a special
status for Australia in a "revivified" British
Empire, a strengthened union that was to be
distinguished by any number of real and
assumed linkages and priorities based on
economic, military, political, and racial arguments. The Commission emphasized the neglected benefits of enduring sentimental ties
between Britain and the old (and of course
white) Dominions, and inevitably a connection
was unashamedly drawn in some quarters
between this notion and the supremacy of
"Anglo-Saxonism. "
Resource inventories of each of the major
Dominions and various imperial "possessions"
were called for to determine ways of reducing
the dependence on foreign suppliers. Britain
was said to be crowded, overpopulated; in
contrast the Dominions were indeed "empty,"
and so the principle of complementary needs
and aspirations seemed obvious. The inauguration of an Australian federal government in
1901 had intensified nationalism on the continent. Australians worried about their small
and predominantly urban population, with a
country-wide average density of scarcely more
than one white inhabitant per square mile. It
was said that settlement of the interior promised to increase productivity and enhance
national security, and even-in terms similar
to those used by Frederick Jackson Turner for
the United States-contribute to the development of a distinctly Australian national
character. Queensland, Western Australia,
and the Northern Territory, immense and selfconsciously young regions of the new Commonwealth, clamored for development. Labor

unions were suspicious of immigration in
general because they feared more competition
among workers, but they favored settlement
schemes that would build domestic markets.
Expansion into new areas also decreased the
need to intensify settlement in the older
districts near the coasts, a demand that had
put state governments at odds with their
substantial landowners. All of these popular
nationalist ideas were congruent with the new
imperialism, and the two strains of thought
combined in widespread public enthusiasm.
In opposition stood Griffith Taylor. His
relentless insistence on regional or national
controls might have struck a more sympathetic
chord if he had balanced it with closely
textured local analyses, which could not have
failed to admit actual and potential human
achievements. At that juncture the Australians were accustomed to local environmental
evaluations, at both the public service and folk
experimentation levels. That kind of specificity
would have made a more promising platform
for the promotion of geography in the "new"
education, but Taylor chose to make his stand
on "national issues" and "nation-planning."
His geography textbook on Australia was
banned by Western Australian education
authorities because of its embarrassing employment of the hated terms desert and aridity, yet
he persisted in his declaration of a relatively
modest national ecumene. Vilified on all sides,
Taylor resigned his Sydney appointment in
1928 to take up a position at the University of
Chicago.
INFLUENCE OF IMMIGRATION

Another expression of imperial optimIsm
was the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, which
allowed the British government to support
development programs and pioneer settlement
schemes in the Dominions, facilitating emigration by paying passages and providing training
and initial living allowances. Ecstatic publicists
insisted that this might bring about 450,000
British immigrants to Australia over the next
decade, but for the most part the legislation
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brought only further confusion. The failure of
sponsored schemes in Western Australia,
Victoria, and New South Wales became
obvious before the end of the 1920s. Worse,
most of the state legislatures had engaged in an
imprudent rush for the "cheap money," and a
hard-won conservatism in rural settlement
policy and practice was crushed by a nationalist-imperialist enthusiasm that justified the
opening up of virgin land on the drier margins
and the subdivision of hundreds of big properties used for livestock and wheat production.
This initiative brought a number of people, as
yet uncounted, to areas of proven hardship.
Many were new to farming, and most were
unaccustomed to semiarid conditions; some
were certainly new to both and to Australia.
The wider Australian community's expectations of more productivity from marginal areas
placed a special burden on the settlers, since
the pioneers' reliance on the governments'
provision of a generous array of credit facilities
made it easy for others to stereotype them as
quasi-mendicants.
SCIENTISM AND THE WELFARE STATE

During the interwar years, planners
around the globe invested high hopes in
science and particularly in the "new" science of
ecology. New Deal scientists in the United
States seemed to have a chance to produce a
coordinated program of conservation drawing
on expertise from many disciplines, but instead
they drew up a number of discrete sets of
recommendations. "Perhaps," Donald Worster
writes, "that is where reliance on scientific
experts inevitably must lead" (Worster 1979,
198). Of the American scientists who promoted the role of ecology in public planning,
possibly the best known internationally were
Frederic Clements and Paul Sears. They
combined to make an urgent case for scientific
leadership on the plains of the United States,
with Sears explaining that scientists were
already deeply involved in developing the
British Empire's resources. The irascible Kansas historian James Malin correctly divined

that such scientific managers were threats to
the myths of "statism" and scientism erected
by the prevailing economic culture to limit
American freedom, but few ecologists had the
time or the inclination to follow their creed to
a full critique of American ways of life and
remained firmly planted in the universities and
colleges. They offered their expert advice to
the planners, "then backed off from the job"
(Worster 1979, 209)-avoiding the martyrdom
suffered by Griffith Taylor.
THE U .S.S.R AND CHINA

A harder rationalism introduced agrarian
communism in the U.S.S.R. and in China. By
1928 about 25 million peasant holdings, averaging 37 acres each, existed in the Soviet
Union. Cossacks, wealthier peasants, seminomadic Kazahks, and others bitterly opposed
their collectivization, destroying their own
crops and livestock. Some peasants did approve of the movement; and by 1940, after a
great deal of suffering, about 97 percent (75
million) were based on 235,000 collectives,
with the remainder scattered over remote
districts. During the early phases of collectivization, planners claimed that communization
approached a return to traditional village life.
Such rationalizations disguised the singlemindedness of the mission but were congruent
with what was probably an equivalent understatement of the productivity of the original
peasant system. Economics of scale permitted
greater mechanization on the collectives, together with a more efficient deployment of
technical and scientific expertise. The state
farm, in which the workers were government
employees, became a favored alternative after
World War II and was significant in the
pioneering of new methods and new regions.
A rapid amalgamation of the old collectives
and the transformation of some of them into
state farms roughly equalized the numbers of
both types by the early 1980s (Shaffer 1977;
Stuart 1983).
One implication of the state farms is that
man can overcome nature and imprint the
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directives of a central authority on the landscape. In the late 1950s, state farms spearheaded a massive entry into Kazakhstan,
western Siberia, and other previously intractable semiarid plains, inspiring the Chinese to
begin agricultural expansion into their own
dry north (Pannell and Ma 1983; Yao 1968).
Westerners have had difficulty in assessing
these actlvltles because the outlines are
obscured by a context of stubborn regional
preferences and the planners' expectations of
agricultural support for favored industrial
programs. Although the Soviet and Chinese
expansions fall outside the period between the
world wars, the similarities to what was
happening elsewhere in those years, particularly in terms of regional preference, scientific
imperative, and centralized planning, are instructive. China's expeditions into "virgin
land" between 1958 and 1965 called upon the
earth sciences to counteract the water imbalance between north and south China (Chung
1968). But in the United States-the very
country that had fostered advanced soil science between the wars-economic ambition
and difficult seasons won out over science and
planning, combining to aggravate six years of
wind erosion that severely damaged over
twelve million acres of sown land, leading to
the abandonment of most of it for farming.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF SCIENCE: AUSTRALIA

If science failed to restrain ambition in the
United States, it did prove "subversive" to
non-British cultures in the British Empire,
especially when mixed with ignorance of other
cultures. In order to understand this phenomenon, let us begin by returning to Australia.
Australia used science in the public service
during the twentieth-century expansion of the
grazing and wheat frontiers, but science did
not always give reliable answers. While a
holistic view appealed for a time to Australia's
botanists, it did not produce successful range
management strategies, particularly because
there was no unequivocal evidence that the
range vegetation had markedly deteriorated
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everywhere, despite generations of opportunistic grazing. By the later 1930s, some scientists
were apparently converted to the folk wisdom
that described vastly more dynamic vegetation
communities-there was at best a "fluctuating
climax," which therefore offered successions of
good and bad seasons. The enthusiastic application of dry farming principles in Australia's
wheat belts also produced sporadic results.
Twenty years or more before the development
of sophisticated dry farming in the United
States, wheat farmers in southeastern Australia had established varying degrees of reliance
on fallowing techniques, but in the early years
of this century a. veritable dry farming cult
mushroomed after leading politicians and
bureaucrats returned from a study tour in
North America (Williams 1974; Powell 1976).
The subsequent unreserved application of
American practices to much drier regions in
Australia was an unusual example of official
and popular accord-but one that led directly
to catastrophic soil erosion, with related
bankruptcies and abandonments. A similar
example is provided in the half-century lag
between British scientists' proof of the value of
superphosphate as a fertilizer and its adoption
in Australia. Despite the efforts of agricultural
research stations and the evangelistic efforts of
]. D. Custance of South Australia's Roseworthy College, public opinion remained
hostile to such "book learning" until two
ordinary farmers made independent experiments using small amounts of the fertilizer in
conjunction with American seed-drilling
equipment. That was the spur and, at last,
official disseminating agencies successfully
marketed the idea-so began Australia's dependence on superphosphate.
In her study of the northern Great Plains,
Mary Hargreaves (1957) explained that conservatism among agricultural scientists may have
limited the impact of their work. In Australia
the comparative dearth of the educational and
research institutions where such scientists
work had a positive as well as a negative side.
Homegrown practical solutions-or ideas that
appeared to be homegrown-frequently had
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maximum effect. Pioneers used their own
enterprising clearing and plowing devices
across Australia's southeastern states. Long
before the discovery of Mendelian principles of
genetics, a Cambridge-educated immigrant,
the former surveyor William James Farrer,
toiled alone in the backcountry of New South
Wales to breed varieties of wheat. Farrer later
worked with Department of Agriculture chemist F. B. Guthrie and before World War II
dozens of their new strains-commercially
viable, early maturing and therefore both
drought-tolerant and rust-escaping-dominated the Australian wheat industry and were
used by international correspondents. In its
immediate utilitarian relevance this cooperation was one of the best kinds of adaptation.
Government departments of agriculture had
sponsored similarly novel programs over the
years, and accommodated a few highly gifted
individuals, but they remained essentially
administrative agencies charged with the diffusion of existing knowledge rather than original
research.
The Australian scientific community operated with a number of handicaps during the
interwar years. Funds were meager. Distances
prevented specialists in the same field from
conferring regularly with each other. Universities were small and few, and most academics
who were not swamped with teaching were
preoccupied with achieving "international"
(i.e., non-Australian) recognition in their field.
Even when the Australian government established the Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR) in 1926, Prime Minister
Stanley Melbourne Bruce and other leaders
expected it to serve as a kind of conduit for the
transfer of British science to Australia. Although the politicians and bureaucrats, accepting client status within the empire, brought
British experts on visits to set down research
guidelines, this flurry of activity failed to
consolidate the old traditions of dependency.
This deliberately overstates the case for the
development of scientific nationalism in Australia, but an explanation of these underlying
tensions is necessary for understanding the

role of science in helping Australians adapt to
semiarid grasslands and savannas. In the early
years of the CSIR, T. B. Robertson, a graduate
of Adelaide University with long postgraduate
and professional experience in physiology and
biochemistry in the United States, proposed a
program of fundamental research on the
connections between animal nutrition and
wool and meat production. David Rivett, chief
executive of CSIR, probably gave the nod to
this attractive lead program because it promised exciting research exemplars. In Britain,
however, Robertson's experiments were heavily criticized-not only on pure scientific
grounds but also by those who sought or
claimed an imperial monopoly and thought
the Australian should concentrate on the
adaptation of existing knowledge to local
conditions. He steadfastly declined to act as a
mere laboratory assistant.
Grossly overworked, Robertson died at
forty-five, but his successors were inspired by
his stand and soon moved on to clarify
important interdependencies between agrostology (botany of grasses), soil chemistry,
biochemistry, and physiology. Their research
demonstrated the significance of trace element
deficiencies in regional soils, first with the
dramatic discovery of cobalt deficiency in
calcareous coastal districts and later with the
discovery of copper, zinc, molybdenum, and
selenium deficiencies, the correction of which
augmented the grazing potential of every state.
The development of vaccines for black sheep
disease in sheep and pleuropneumonia in
cattle also exemplified a distinctively utilitarian Australian science, though the Empire
Marketing Board and the Pasteur Institute in
Paris contributed to this effort. Economic
entomology, a new field in the 1920s, proved
to be a particularly good area for demonstrating Australia's independent national effort in
applied science. Scientists achieved spectacular
results in biologically controlling the prickly
pear, an introduced plant pest that was
invading thousands of square miles of pastureland in Queensland and New South Wales, by
introducing Cactoblastis cactorum, a natural
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predator. This triumph won the scientists
further security within Australia and encouraged the pursuit of additional fundamental
research without resort to any cap-in-hand
apologia.
The launching of the CSIR's division of
economic entomology in 1928 resulted in the
design of ambitious programs to counter rabbit
and locust plagues and to control major
pasture weeds and the sheep blowfly. The
1930s depression brought a fresh influx of
funds to the CSIR's applied research teams: a
prominent example was the decision of the
Australian Wool Board, created in 1936, to
support the CSIR and not the university
departments. Unfortunately, after 1945 political pressures as well as the lure of private
industry and "big science" enticed gifted
individuals away from public service and
hampered CSIR research. We know too little
about the role of science in the Australian
polity to do more than begin a comparison of
Australian and American experiences in agricultural research. Possibly, more of Australia's
applied scientists became lost in their own
version of the bureaucratic machine, or there
may have been smaller representations of
highly competent scientists and technologists
in senior positions in our service agencies.
Certainly absent were individuals like Hugh
Hammond Bennett, an excellent publicist and
political tactician who guided America's Soil
Conservation Service through the thirties and
forties. A detailed history of the CSIR
(CSIRO) will soon be published, and it may
disclose the extent to which its leaders were
drawn to opposing models in the foundation
years of boom and depression-to academia's
staid departmental structures or to more
flexible, mission-oriented frame works. (But
that history may in itself show the influence of
American commentaries on Australian historical researchers-cf. McDean 1983; Hall 1983;
Peterson 1980).
SETTLEMENT AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

In comparison with the situation in other
parts of the New World, the social sciences in

Australia remained underdeveloped and underconsulted. Yet the payment of society's
"debt of honor" to returning war veterans by
land settlement seemed to be obvious and
natural to both Australians and Canadians,
and offered a role for social sciences. About
seventy thousand veterans and their families
were involved in settlement schemes in the
plains of both countries. In Canada federal
government controls and the application of
rural sociology models were stronger. In Australia nationalistic and imperialistic sentiments
permeated most of the schemes, and high
levels of emotionalism, along with the wellmeaning but frequently muddled activities of
local patriotic associations, did little to promote rational planning measures. A shaky
partnership between Australia's federal and
state authorities led to a diffusion of settlement
over dry and irrigated estates and individual
small farms and to unfortunate divisions of
responsibility among local, state, and federal
authorities and a host of voluntary agencies.
The Australian confusion was understandable. A very young nation of about five million
souls suffered 60,000 dead and more than
100,000 other casualties, proportionally more
than any other empire country. Approximately 250,000 discharged soldiers had to be
reinstated in civilian life. In the rush to find a
solution, elementary economic and environmental appraisals were forgotten and agricultural research, marketing strategies, and farm
training programs received little consideration.
Settled on high-cost lands in confident times,
within less than a decade the veterans were
struggling with prohibitively high mortgages
and production costs as world commodity
prices were falling. By the late 1920s, thousands were declared "failed. " Yesterday's
heroes, they were mown down at last by
mismanagement, relentless economic pressures, droughts, and floods-and by a marked
reversal of the previous goodwill shown alike
by lands administrators and the wider community. The gap between yeomen and bureaucrats-that vital barrier to the dialogue
required for secure adaptation-widened
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again. The federal government was obliged to
intervene to adjust loans and farm sizes around
the country, another small step toward centralization in Australian affairs. Even so, there
was remarkably little empathy with those
veterans who obviously found it agonizingly
difficult to complete their rehabilitation on
Australia's lonely backblocks. The psychological dimension was not deeply investigated and
sometimes individuals were ruthlessly discarded in arrogant bureaucratic memoranda:
"Not a trier"; "Weed, mentally and physically"; "Very bad type. Wilfully neglected stock
and plant"; "Lazy and a drunkard." Yet the
combat experience of the "failed" settlers as a
group was probably fully representative of the
Australian contribution to the cruel stupidities
of Europe's war (Powell 1985). Additional local
investigations may show that new social divisions were created in this period in many small
rural communities. Although that remains yet
another unwritten chapter in the interpretation of settlers' adaptation on the plains, the
lessons of the debacle did contribute to the
success of similar schemes after 1945.
Canada's federal program was markedly
paternalistic, at least in the beginning, and
showed some of the influence of U.S. progressive rural sociology. Town-planning adviser
Thomas Adams, who represented the British
school of community planning, called unsuccessfully for a "scientific organization" of the
soldier settlement project to intensify existing
settlement in established regions by means of
compact, cooperative colonies and mixed
Garden City-style estates. The Soldier Settlement Board had different but ambitious
aims, supervising the settlement process on
about five million acres of the prairies. The
hesitantly expanding work of the Home
Branch provided a vital complement to the
Board's hard-won expertise in financial administration and technical supervision, if only in
its efforts to provide home management
courses and the like to rescue the pioneer's wife
from "a mental oasis on a prairie farm" (Powell
1979, 1982a). The Adams-style community
system was rejected in favor of old-style

individualistic endeavors, yet by the end of the
depression a 75 to 80 percent retenLion rate of
soldier settlers was claimed for the prairie
provinces. In fact, the Settlement Board was
judged one of the more valuable institutional
adaptations, and its responsibilities were subsequently extended. Not everyone was pleased,
however. As in Australia, some observers
feared that the settlement schemes were dangerous departures from traditional capitalism,
with the effect of shedding the healthy selfreliance of the pioneers for a weak-willed
dependence on the state. Like Australians,
Canadians were unsure of their national
ambitions; also like the Australians, many
Canadians interpreted experience in terms of
the lessons of pioneer settlement. The settlers
did not want to be treated as guinea pigs or as
chips in a game of chance. And, at least in
some cases, the most abject "failures" by
official description may have succeeded very
well indeed by their own reckoning-they
moved on, profiting financially and in farming
experience.
WATER AND ECONOMY: THE SUDAN

In both Australia and Canada, the agricultural settlement of semiarid lands was carried
out by European-descended peoples who easily
accommodated to British forms of government. When settlement schemes were imposed
by imperial policymakers on peoples with
totally different cultural backgrounds, the
problems involved in the projects were quite
different, as we can see by turning to an
African example. After the battle of Omdurman in 1898, the Sudan was made a
condominium under Anglo-Egyptian control.
The Sudan was the ward and Egypt very much
the junior partner; it was therefore left to the
British, as they saw it, to bring "civilization" to
the Sudanese people (Gaitskell 1959). Sudan's
traditional semi subsistence economy was
based on peasant farming and nomadic pastoralism, offering only gum, hides and skins,
ivory, and ostrich feathers for world markets.
The British confidently declared that the
Sudan's most pressing need was more British
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officials and rapid capital investment in railways and irrigation. The Gezira project, south
of Khartoum between the Blue and White
Niles, became the cornerstone of this great
imperial adventure in an increasingly bureaucratic and technocratic age, an age far
more like our own than the popular images of
governors' levees and tiger hunts suggest.
The mysterious sources of the Nile were
unknown to the Western world until the
expeditions of Speke, Burton, Baker, and
Stanley in the late nineteenth century. Less
spectacular expeditions made by senior engineers in the early twentieth century also
frequently yielded valuable accounts of natural
and social environments. Although these
engineers failed to decipher the fascinating
geohydrological history of the region, which is
highly complex and crucial to an understanding of intransigent management problems,
including salting (cf. Williams and Adamson
1982), the early engineering expeditions not
only resulted in a gigantic project but also
served as a remarkable training ground for
imperial technocrats. With Indian, American,
and Australian experience to draw upon, the
Gezira scheme was multipurpose from its
inception in 1904. Long staple cotton was to
provide the economic base, but its cultivation
entailed a complex conversion of the peasant
farming communities and newly devised crop
rotations to maximize productivity and minimize soil losses and reductions in the quality
and volume of water. Meanwhile, Egypt's
ancient rights to the downstream flow had to
be safeguarded.
A
novel partnership
agreement was drawn up among the
condominium government, a private management syndicate with guaranteed connections
in the Lancashire textile industry, and the
tenant cultivators. Tenants held their land
from the government, which in turn rented it
from the original owners; food and fodder
crops were retained by the tenants; the cotton
crop was handed over to the management for
marketing, the tenants retaining a share of the
proceeds proportional to the amount of cotton
they delivered. Paternalism did llot extend to

land nationalization, yet control was quite
effectively ensured by restricting, not removing, traditional proprietorial rights. Similarly,
since the government took on the rental for
forty years there could be no immediate
problem with incremental values; and finally,
neither land nor crops could normally be used
to secure mortgages or debts of any description.
The Sennar dam supplied over 300,000
acres of the Gezira. A regional research farm
maintained a close liaison with the Empire
Cotton Growing Association and Britain's
Rothamsted Experimental Station; visiting
consultants of the highest repute were brought
to the Sudan, and a London Advisory Committee proffered regular critiques. The Gezira
project represented the "trusteeship" strain of
empire which aimed to build up the dynamic
indigenous economy while ensuring that the
new wealth was not concentrated into the
hands of a favored few. The outstanding early
technical successes of the project encouraged
further expansions that were accelerated in the
1950s, when the irrigated area grew to about
two million acres. Income returned to the
Gezira has indeed been widely distributed
among a tenant population numbering more
than 300,000 families, plus some 500,000
seasonal laborers from West Africa and Westtern Sudan. The tenants generally resisted the
managers' efforts to place them on easily
monitored individual blocks; the compromise
was a fairly regular dispersal of villages, the
peasants' preferred settlement form, at intervals of two or three kilometers along the
distributary canals. Schistosomiasis, already
endemic in the Sudan, increased on the Gezira
and remained a problem despite the treatment
of infected canals with copper sulphate.
Egypt's claims on the Nile were strengthened
by an engineering-dominated agreement in
1929, but the remaining uncertainties made
diplomacy an additional water management
skill.
The trusteeship claim began to ring hollow
in the interwar period and the unfinished
history of the Gezira project still carries a
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warning. The Gezira might have lanched a
"Sudanization" process, but transfer of power
did not occur until after World War II,
precipitated by urgent local demands, international affairs, and the revolution in Egypt in
1952. The Gezira was also an early example of
the kind of "growth pole" tactic favored by
Western and communist planners alike, but its
attraction for successive Sudanese governments exposed the one-eyed inefficiencies of
the approach. The inheritance of regional
inequality became oppressive in the postwar
world, and was an immediate cause of rebellions in the 1960s and 1970s when over one
million people perished through famine, disease, and widespread violence (Roden 1974). In
the wider context, the source-to-sea division of
a single hydrological system between several
independent nations was another unfortunate
legacy of European imperialism.
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

Variety was the keynote of development in
Africa's semiarid territories during the period
between the world wars, and the Gezira IS
more unique than representative; in fact it
may be more realistic to evaluate it
internationally, against other contemporary
irrigation enterprises. Yet it contains important commonalities central to much of the
African experience in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Throughout Africa a
deliberately increased emphasis on export
crops accompanied the emergence of a highly
dualistic agrarian economy, peasant and plantation, or quasiplantation, side by side. The
export-oriented enterprises benefited from the
selection of soils and other natural conditions,
sophisticated administrative and credit facilities, agro-scientific expertise, and a highly
capitalized infrastructure for storage, transportation, and marketing, while the peasant
sector was often denied these advantages. The
Gezira only partially escapes this censure
because of the planned rotation of peasantplantation crops in a sequence designed essentially to improve the commercial enterprise.
The autonomous but unstable govern-

ments of today's Africa, hampered by the
remnants of old structures of dependency,
struggle to take their people into a new and
more secure era. Interested in ensuring a
steady labor supply for export commodities,
colonial governments discriminated against
Africa's peasant economies, particularly by the
manipulation of food prices, thus largely
preventing the peasants' rise to economic
independence. Managers of the Gezira project
cited idealism in their drive to prevent land
amalgamation, but they also prevented the
emergence of an intermediate commercial
class-an ambiguous result. Indeed it is not
hard to argue that colonialism led to the
comparative atrophy of the indigenous foodproducing sector and to increased dependence
on export crops throughout Africa, in spite of
differing environments. African countries, still
reliant on exports, continue to confront the
problem. Yet the Western capitalism introduced by the colonial powers is not the only
economic intrusion. Tanzania's unsuccessful
and mismanaged attempt to introduce agrarian socialism in the 1970s provides a counter
example. Although bad weather undoubtedly
contributed to a sharp decline in food production, it was the reluctance of the peasants to
accept collective villages that resulted in the
policy's reversal. The Special Rural Development Program in Kenya after independence
brought social disruption in the wake of
introducing a system of freehold titles into a
traditional land system. Perhaps peasants have
formed an "awkward class" everywhere, and
not simply in orthodox Marxist theory (d.
Shanin 1972; also Dias 1981, Hill 1982; and see
Gonzales 1978). These examples also illustrate
the marked resilience of the peasant mode of
production. In all of them there was too much
planning from above, too little patient consultation with the local people, and far too little
of what communities in the developed world
now expect in the form of public participation.
IRRIGATION IN AUSTRALIA

The Gezira's political, scientific, and technological champions were fired, for one thing,

ABIDETH FOREVER? 165

by the threatened emergence of communism in
the less developed world. Such concerns were
voiced less often during the contemporaneous
consolidation of similarly large governmentcontrolled schemes in Australia, where since
the 1880s irrigation had been accepted as a
small but integral part of a much vaunted
"State Socialism." Modern Western observers
accept irrigation as resource development
investment-making deserts bloom in relatively restricted but well selected localities-or as
stabilizing rural production over much wider
areas. For most New World countries the
overriding appeal of the first of these alternatives is undeniable. Public enthusiasm for
irrigation in Australia soared after major
droughts in the 1870s, 1890s, the early years of
this century, 1911, and during World War II,
but until recent decades the projects seldom
focused on the second alternative. Australia's
socialistic adaptations partly reflected the
environmental naivete' and political strength
of the nation's overwhelmingly urban communities, but were also dictated by the realization
that enormous investments would be required
to combat a demanding physical environment.
Political theorists and progressives of various
persuasions could choose fo see government
intervention as appropriate to the times, and
promising a more equitable distribution and
effective use of scarce supplies. Thus a simple
nationalism was woven through all the
schemes for using Australia's land and water.
Australian governments favored "intensive" schemes of group settlement to benefit as
many families as possible. New irrigation
projects, frequently associated with closer
settlement schemes in each state, were justified
as maximizing opportunities for pioneer farmers and providing increased security for the
family farm. The imperial pattern is evident in
both the preliminary design and in subsequent
routine management, where it penetrated most
areas of administrative, legislative, and technical practice. Western American experience was
also highly influential. From the 1880s, water
management in Australia had its share of
visiting experts, but this was more than

balanced by local knowledge and by the early
employment of an uncommonly productive
variant of the overseas study tour. Lessons
from Egypt, India, Italy, and the United States
were carefully sifted and widely circulated.
John Wesley Powell offered his views, and
there was considerable interest in the advice
received from the state engineers of California
and Colorado. In the colony of Victoria the
innovative riparian legislation that effectively
nationalized all surface waters built on outside
advice as well as upon tortuous mining litigation of immigrant Californians in the 1850s
and 1860s; it borrowed from administrative
and legal initiatives in British India and from
contemporary local enactments.
Unfortunately, the Australians elected to
rely solely upon superficial engineering perspectives in the construction of the irrigation
works, instead of using their talented geologists
to research the ancient geomorphological
history of the riverine plains. This contemporary preference for unidisciplinary approaches
missed the practical significance of the geomorphological record to irrigators. The Murrumbidgee riverine district, for instance, has been
shown to be a Pleistocene alluvial plain
resembling the current plains of the Nile and
bearing little relationship to today's rivers. The
higher discharges and steeper gradients of its
ancient streams enabled them to carry more
sand and gravel than today's highly sinuous
Murrumbidgee, in which silt and clay are
predominant. Such detailed features profoundly affect drainage, irrigation, and crop yield,
but were not well understood until the postwar
diffusion of synthesizing land-type analyses
developed in the United States at the end of
the 1930s (Langford-Smith and Rutherford
1966; Hudson 1936).
The American connection was important,
but movements were two-way. In 1907 the
nomadic Elwood Mead left his position in the
U.S. Office of Irrigation Investigations to take
up his appointment as chairman of Victoria's
State Rivers and Water Supply Commission.
Still inspired by the dream of using irrigation
as a lever for social reform (Pisani 1983; Powell
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1976), Mead, over the next eight years, supported both "extensive" or partial irrigation to
stabilize dry farming enterprises and intensive
schemes of the closer settlement variety.
Clearly he then favored the latter, and this
preference led to an imbalance that strengthened after his departure from Victoria. Back in
the U.S., Mead maintained his Australian
interests (Powell 1982b) and acted in a lucrative consultancy capacity from time to time. In
1923 he investigated progress on the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area (MIA) for the New
South Wales government, emphasizing the
need to integrate irrigated and nonirrigated
areas by fattening sheep and other dry land
stock on fodder crops, and particularly on
specialized lucerne (alfalfa) farms, in the irrigated districts. At the time, Mead's advice fell
on deaf ears. Rank and file settlers, historically
as relevant in that region as the transplanted
experts, were joined by broken miners from
Broken Hill and by the equally troubled
returned soldiers, and they eventually com-

bined to Win concessions from the state
government.
IRRIGATORS AND POLITICS; AUSTRALIA

By the late 1920s the several specialized
experimental research stations in the MIA
maintained close liaison with government
scientists, but the absence of effective extension services handicapped the diffusion of
findings on soils, salinization, and rotation
systems. The continuing cooperative spirit
among the settlers filled the gap. Four farmers
joined the scientific advisory committee for the
region in 1927; more farmers were appointed
in 1938 and in the war years additional
representatives were appointed from the Rural
Bank, the Department of Agriculture, and the
farmers' cooperative organizations. Another
broad-based body, the Irrigation Research
Extension Committee, included representatives from the farmers' cooperatives after 1941
and was further augmented from the Universi-
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FIG. 2. Major irrigation regions of southeastern Australia, showing principal rivers and average annual
rainfall (in inches). The Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area, discussed in the text, is identified (MIA).
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ty of Sydney, the Soil Conservation Service,
and elsewhere. The result was not only a wellstaffed headquarters circulating large quantities of information, supervising field days and
group meetings, and coordinating hundreds of
volunteers, but also an influential forum for
the airing of farmers' grievances-the MIA's
own "agricultural parliament." This example
of regional enterprise lost its effectiveness
during the 1950s, when it was swallowed up in
the labyrinths of the New South Wales bureaucracy.
But flexibility is necessary for survival in an
erratic climate and these novel adaptations in
the MIA did not mitigate the rigidities common to closer settlement schemes dependent
on irrigation. In Australia the engineer's
passionate concern that all water be applied to
maximum effect by every user normally led to
the agencies' zealous insistence on intensive
cultivation and an ostentatiously paternalistic
control over the physical planning of the
irrigation settlements. To some extent the
emulation of MIA-style cooperation tempered
this single-minded ness, but in general all
parties were agreed that the intensive system
was to be preferred. In Australia a way-of-life
option was preferred to cool efficiency-a
theme that many commentators continue to
find exasperating and enviable. The main
concessions won by the settlers involved
protecting their individual stakes in the
scheme, not challenging its fundamental assumptions. Settlers were inclined to agree with
a distinguished official arbitrator that it would
be unreasonable to ask a pioneer farmer to
accept an average income below that of a mere
water bailiff. Contemporaries believed that the
local communities had forced adaptations in
the system: in review, the opposite effect could
have been claimed with equal validity. Irrigation is now regularly rejected by Australia's
economists (e.g., Davidson 1969).
The emergence of sectional tensions and
the development of new farming frontiers
remote from th~ settled fringes led to regionalist political movements. Irrigators, small wheat
farmers, and wheat-and-sheep farmers alike

supported a fledgling anticentralist Country
party that adroitly held the balance of power
at federal and state levels for long periods
during the interwar years. It was intimately
associated with several very popular "new
states" movements, and with secessionist interests in Western Australia and in the Riverina
of New South Wales, where the MIA provided
a strong nucleus. Much of the agitation was
antiurban, demanding better rewards for those
who claimed to be the real pioneers of Australia. The uncertainties incident to life in the
semiarid plains, together with the wider center-periphery tensions in the young nation,
involved pioneer farmers in continuing political and economic agitation.
FAMILIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS

The settlement margins of Argentina and
Canada offer provocative contrasts to those of
Australia. Wheat farming prospered on the
large estates of the pampas, supported by
phenomenal waves of immigration. Argentina
was part of Britain's informal empire, but its
immigration program was dominated by
southern Europeans-most of all by millions of
Italians, who were generally content to become
laborers or tenant farmers and took little part
in Argentinian politics (Solberg 1982). In
contrast, except for Clifford Sifton's attempts
to attract colonists from eastern Europe,
Canada's restrIctIve immigration policies
brought prairie settlers mainly from Britain,
northern and western Europe, the United
States, and the older provinces of Ontario,
Quebec, and the Maritimes. Homesteading
was the rule and popular participation in
Canada's democratic politics an established
tradition. Accordingly, strong agrarian
movements developed to safeguard the interests of the peripheral region (Mackintosh 1924;
Wood 1924; Morton 1934). The pampas was
comparatively densely populated and this,
together with its entrenched connections with
the capital, guaranteed that there were few of
the problems with industrial tariff protection
that plagued wheat farmers on the plains of
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North America and Australia. Argentine
agriculture was therefore given a competitive
edge by the lower costs of labor and imports,
including farm machinery; in addition the
tenant farmers, however poor their condition
otherwise, were not burdened with heavy
mortgages, and rentals were often reduced
when agricultural prices followed a sustained
decline (Solberg 1971). Climatic restrictions in
the prairie provinces reduced opportunities for
diversification from wheat, a favored strategy
in Australia. In the 1930s the collapse of world
prices and a succession of droughts bankrupted many prairie communities and, as in
Australia, farmers sought government assistance in the form of soil conservation programs, various types of loans and debt
adjustments, wheat stabilization schemes, and
the like. In Canada the old option was still
being exercised to some extent-moving on to
virgin country-but that had become less
common in Australia's wheatlands.
None of this says enough about the most
valuable institution in any rural region, the
family. Whether nuclear or extended, the
family offered farmers all their props and most
of their motivation, yet it is today often
ignored or sentimentalized. Families allowed
the pooling of labor, finances, knowledge, and
emotional investment, so families often settled
in earlier and survived when individual homesteaders went to the wall. When they had to
leave in mass regional emigrations, their plight
was sung in literary classics of the 1930s.
Building on more ancient traditions, Mikhail
Sholokhov's Quiet Flows the Don and John
Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath captured some of
the essence of land-rootedness that Wordsworth had explained over a century earlierthe land was CIa fountain fitted to the nature of
social man from which supplies of affection
... are daily drawn" (see Craig 1974; Jensen
and Miller 1980). Many of the farmers of the
Russian steppes and North China Plain were
new to those regions, new to farming, and so
the land did not symbolize the way of life of
their ancestors. Families in the semiarid regions of the New World were scarcely peasants

in any Old World sense; even so, the territorial
bond was obviously threatened, and it remains
difficult for Australian and Canadian readers
t~ understand why Steinbeck's migrants never
organized. Is it true that American rural
society remained stratified, that aid to the
rural poor was less generous during the New
Deal than it might have been? If so, are we
merely dealing with a continuum, capitalistsocialist, with the two British Dominions
occupying central positions? It can't be that
simple.
Although there were collective adaptations
on the Australian and Canadian plains that
took the form of bold and durable expressions
of regional identity, in order to understand
them we need more methodical local analyses
of the changes in family farm structures-in
good oral history, in empathetic fiction like
Grapes of Wrath, and in the kind of work in
social anthropology that John Bennett and his
associates have produced for Saskatchewan
(Bennett 1982). As for the differences between
the forms of rural protest in Australia and
Canada, my tentative view is that the three
adjacent prairie provinces offered an unusually
extensive and homogenous base that was not
matched in Australia, where similarly disaffected communities were scattered around the
desert heart, obliged to direct their venom at
individual state authorities as well as the
Commonwealth government. Agricultural adjustment and other government interventions
in Australia and Canada are now long-established elements of rural living. For the United
States, Worster and others claim that the
opportunities for fundamental social reform
were not realized-neither in the administration of various relief measures nor in rural
planning. The New Deal brought no new deal
for the rural poor; rather it conserved and
protected corporate capitalism by assisting
those with greater political and economic
muscle. In Australia and Canada some of the
louder calls for reform came from organized
rural groups. Admittedly, neither country
boasts the volume of interdisciplinary research
which has illuminated this period for the
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United States, yet there is enough to suggest
that extremes of wealth and poverty were
rather less apparent and that plains people had
found ways of using their governments. The
exceptions are Indians and aboriginals, the
dispossessed, for most of whom Depression was
the normal condition, environmental destruction a continuing tragedy. Forty years later,
when these indigenous peoples at last developed their own protest movements, rural
communities that had often displayed their
own best skills in similar campaigns bitterly
attacked native claims to unique land rights.
CONCLUSION

In all our examples, despite regional protests, control over agrarian economic policy
remained outside the producing regions:
whether wheat farmers, graziers, or irrigators,
the peoples of the semiarid lands were dependent upon decisions made in humid,
industrializing fringes-which were in turn still
peripheral to the metropolitan hearths. Donald Worster identified with the last generation
to find their dreams in American land, and
described how an economic and ecological
crisis left only "a cultural boneyard, where the
evidence of bad judgment and misplaced
schemes lie strewn about like bleached skulls"
(Worster 1979,3). As a paradigm for environmental history Worster's interpretation extends beyond his original specification of time
and place, and the complex varieties of adaptation on the world's semiarid plains reveal an
interweaving of modern, traditional, socialist,
and capitalist modes that the casual vocabulary of "success" and "failure" obfuscates. The
international perspective also discloses that
any tight focus on plains areas alone-however
convenient or dramatic that appears to be for
committed ecological and literary scholarship-may prove fragile or even self-defeating.
The mission of our teaching and research
in the modern history of the world's semiarid
lands requires us to communicate the sense of
a profoundly significant community of interest

and a proper grasp of continuity. The resonances of the interwar crises remain pervasive
and beckoning. Those crises were at once
environmental and social, political and administrative; parsimoniously set in any single
national context they are oversimplified and
even incomprehensible. It must be made clear
that neither capitalism nor socialism nor any
admixture of the two has provided a satisfying,
ecologically adaptive culture. Over the past
fifty years, reformers have tried to put their
various houses in order (Sears 1937) with only
limited success. Perhaps the indulgent fragmentations of academic discourse distort our
perceptions, thereby compounding the very
problems we address and reducing the' utility
of our approaches for the wider community.
We might do more to close the gap between
our formal programs of teaching and research
and the rich heritage of vernacular modes of
inquiry. And our interpretations need not
commence with economic ideologies in every
case but with the experiences of actual settlers
and with interdisciplinary sorties of pure and
applied science: so we may have a science for
citizenship, not for the scientist or for the sake
of science itself; and today, more than ever
before, it must not be designed solely for the
kind of "nation planning" so dear to Griffith
Taylor but rather for world citizenship. Only
then, as Earth and Mankind intertwine in
stressful coauthorship, can they produce a
legible document for a sustainable future.
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